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TERRIBLE TOOLS FOR PROSECUTORS: NOTES ON SENATOR LEAHY’S PROPOSAL TO
“FIX” SKILLING V. UNITED STATES
Albert W. Alschuler *
ABSTRACT
This article examines a proposed legislative response to Skilling v. United States, a response
approved by the Senate but never voted on by the House. It argues that federal mail fraud
prosecutions disgrace American criminal justice and that amending the mail fraud statute to
proscribe “undisclosed self-dealing” would make them worse.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1
I. BACKGROUND: FROM MAIL FRAUD TO MCNALLY TO THE HONEST SERVICES
STATUTE TO SKILLING ....................................................................................... 1
II. THE HISTORY OF SENATOR LEAHY’S PROPOSAL SO FAR .................................... 4
III. CRIMINALIZING UNDISCLOSED SELF-DEALING .................................................. 6
IV. THE FIRST ELEMENT: SELF-DEALING………….………...…………………….9
A. The Ubiquity of Self-Dealing ..................................................................... 8
B. The Uncertain Status of Campaign Contributions ...................................... 9
C. Benefits Given to Friends and Relatives ..................................................... 13
D. Benefits Given by Lobbyists and Other Friends ......................................... 13
E. Advancing Financial Interests ..................................................................... 14
F. Proving Purpose ........................................................................................... 9
V. THE SECOND ELEMENT: NON-DISCLOSURE IN VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LAW…………………………………………….15
A. Standing Federalism on Its Head ................................................................ 15
B. Leahy's Paradox .......................................................................................... 9
C. Federal, State, and Local Disclosure Rules: A Tangle ................................ 19
VI. THE PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF CREATING ANOTHER FORM OF
MAIL FRAUD ..................................................................................................... 20
CONCLUSION: WHAT'S WRONG WITH CONGRESS? ................................................... 25

*

Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, The University of
Chicago.

TERRIBLE TOOLS FOR PROSECUTORS: NOTES ON SENATOR LEAHY’S
PROPOSAL TO “FIX” SKILLING V. UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, denounced Supreme Court’s recent decision in Skilling v.
United States 1 and proposed restoring 20-year penalties for what he called
“undisclosed self-dealing.” In 2012, the Senate approved Senator Leahy’s
proposal without significant opposition, and the House Judiciary Committee
endorsed the proposal unanimously. Because the majority leader of the
House failed to bring it to a vote, however, the 112th Congress ended
without enacting Senator Leahy’s proposal. Congress continues to consider
its response to Skilling.
This article maintains that Senator Leahy’s proposal would make federal
mail fraud prosecutions even more dreadful than they already are.
Congress’s near approval of this measure without notable criticism or
opposition reveals an institution in which ill considered posturing on
criminal justice issues still goes unchallenged.
I. BACKGROUND: FROM MAIL FRAUD TO MCNALLY TO THE “HONEST
SERVICES” STATUTE TO SKILLING
The federal mail fraud statute, enacted in 1872, was the first statute to
“federalize” crimes against private individuals that formerly had been
prosecuted only by state and local authorities. The statute was aimed, not at
dishonest government officials, but at swindlers who used the mails to
peddle things like phony western mining stock. 2 The statute forbids
“devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud” and then placing something
in the mail for the purpose of executing the scheme. 3 As the Supreme Court
recognized in 1999, the 1872 statute did no more than incorporate
traditional concepts of fraud. 4 Fraud, a common law tort, consists of causing
someone to part with his property or to act in other disadvantageous ways
by lying. 5
1

130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
The sponsor of the measure declared that it would “prevent the frauds which are
mostly gotten up in the cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the
purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country.” See McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35
(1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
4
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1999).
5
A treatise published shortly after Congress enacted the mail fraud statute described
2
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Federal prosecutors pressed courts to stretch the statute, and particularly
in the 1970s, they did. By 1987, nearly every federal court of appeals had
held that the statute outlawed deprivations of “the intangible right of honest
services,” and none had rejected this conclusion. 6 These courts agreed that
accepting a bribe or kickback deprived the public of its intangible right to
honest services, and they said that other things did too. As the Supreme
Court observed in Skilling, however, they were in “considerable disarray”
about what the other things were. 7
In 1987, the Supreme Court called a halt, one that turned out to be
fleeting. In McNally v. United States, 8 the Court held that the mail fraud
statute outlawed deprivations of property, not of an ill-defined intangible
right to honest services.
At the time of McNally, federal law had prohibited the bribery of federal
officials for more than a century, 9 and Congress had made it a federal crime
to bribe state and local officials three years earlier. 10 Dissatisfied with these
straightforward prohibitions of bribery and the numerous other devices it
had for prosecuting dishonest officials, 11 the Justice Department
complained that McNally had deprived it of an important tool in its fight
against government corruption. It sought restoration of the honest-services
gimmick, and Congress speedily complied. It enacted a new section of the
mail fraud statute that read in full, “For the purposes of this chapter, the
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive

the elements of this tort:
It is a general rule of law that, in order to obtain redress or relief from the
injurious consequences of deceit, it is necessary for the complaining party
to prove that his adversary has made a false representation of material facts;
that he made it with knowledge of its falsity; that the complaining party was
ignorant of its falsity, and believed it to be true; that it was made with intent
that it should be acted upon; and that it was acted upon by the complaining
party to his damage.
MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD 1 (1877).
6
See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362-64 & nn.1-3 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir. 1988).
7
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929.
8
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
9
See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 462, 491 (1984); 18 U.S.C. § 201.
10
See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (prohibiting the bribery of any official of a state or local
government that receives $10,000 or more per year in federal benefits, as almost every state
and local government does).
11
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbs Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-62 (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the Money Laundering Control Act); 26 U.S.C. §
7201 (tax evasion).
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another of the intangible right of honest services.” 12
Although the statute did not define the critical term, no Member of
Congress appears to have said, “This thing is gibberish, and I won’t vote for
it.” 13 As William Stuntz observed, “[T]he story of American criminal law is
a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of
whom benefits from more and broader crimes.” 14
The Supreme Court did not consider either the meaning or the
constitutionality of the honest-services statute until Skilling v. United States
in 2010. By that time, the government was able to cite substantial authority
for the proposition that the statute proscribed “undisclosed self-dealing.” 15
Although the government urged the Supreme Court to approve this
standard, the Court not only rejected it but also took the unusual step of
warning Congress that legislation approving it might be held
unconstitutional. 16 In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court declared
that it could save the honest-services statute from a “vagueness shoal”17
only by confining it to the “solid core” that all the lower courts had
recognized. 18 The Court held, “[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass
conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and
kickbacks. . . . [N]o other misconduct falls within § 1346’s province.” 19
Three justices—Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—would have held
the statute unconstitutionally vague. 20
II. THE HISTORY OF SENATOR LEAHY’S PROPOSAL SO FAR
Soon after Skilling, Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, declared that the Supreme Court had “sided with an
Enron executive convicted of fraud” and “undermined Congressional efforts
to protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests.” 21 Although the
12

18 U.S.C. § 1346.
What became the honest services statute was joined with new mandatory minimum
sentences in an omnibus drug control bill. The House approved this measure by a vote of
375 to 30 and the Senate by a vote of 87 to 3. Library of Congress, Bill Summary and
Status, 100th Cong., H.R. 5210, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d100:HR05210:@@@R.
14
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 510 (2001).
15
See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932.
16
Id. at 2933 n.44.
17
Id. at 2907.
18
Id. at 2930.
19
Id. at 2933.
20
See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
21
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, RESTORING KEY TOOLS TO COMBAT FRAUD
AND CORRUPTION AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S SKILLING DECISION, HEARING BEFORE
13
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senator’s denunciation of Skilling might be regarded as just the way
politicians talk, consider for a moment how tawdry this talk is. In Skilling,
the Supreme Court struggled to salvage and make sense of an apparently
incomprehensible statute. As Senator Leahy described it, however, every
member of a unanimous Court—Ruth Bader Ginsburg as well as Antonin
Scalia—had sided with a dishonest Enron executive and powerful interests
against hardworking Americans. 22
To repair the damage wrought by Skilling, Senator Leahy introduced a
measure he called “The Honest Services Restoration Act.” 23 The Senate
Judiciary Committee held a very brief hearing on this proposal. It styled this
hearing “Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the
Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision.” 24
Members of Congress often speak of giving “tools” to prosecutors. 25
They never speak of giving “tools” to defense attorneys and rarely speak of
doing justice.
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY

at 1, 111th Cong. (2010).
The defendant in Skilling was indeed “an Enron executive convicted of fraud.”
23
S.3854,
111th
Cong.
(2010),
available
at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3854/text. This initial version of Senator
Leahy’s proposal would have outlawed undisclosed self-dealing not only by public
officials but also by the officers and directors of publicly traded corporations and private
charities. The version later approved by the Senate would have proscribed self-dealing only
by public officials. This article does not consider Senator Leahy’s proposal for restricting
self-dealing by private individuals.
24
See RESTORING KEY TOOLS, supra note .
25
The full title of the USA Patriot Act is the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.
See Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The full title of the PROTECT Act is the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003.
See Pub. L. No. 10-821, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
Prosecutors seem unembarrassed to request new “tools” and offended when existing
“tools” are threatened. After Attorney General Eric Holder endorsed the reduction of some
mandatory minimum sentences, the National Association of Assistant United States
Attorneys sent a public letter of protest:
22

[M]andatory minimum sentences are a critical tool in persuading defendants to
cooperate, thereby enabling law enforcement officers to dismantle large drug
organizations and violent gangs. Present law provides numerous opportunities
for deserving defendants to avoid mandatory sentences through: cooperation in
providing information about other criminals and criminal enterprises; plea
bargaining, which resolves the vast majority of federal cases; [and other
mechanisms].
Letter from the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys to the Hon. Eric
H. Holder, Jr., Jan. 27, 2014, available at http://www.mainjustice.com/wpadmin/documents-databases/187-1-NAAUSA-leter-to-Holder.pdf.
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In written statements submitted to the committee, two criminal defense
attorneys maintained that prosecutors had abundant tools already. 26 The
only witnesses actually to appear before the committee were a
representative of the Justice Department and three former federal
prosecutors.
One of these witnesses, George J. Terwilliger III, endorsed a Skilling
“fix” somewhat tentatively. He suggested that the issue required further
study and that legislation prohibiting undisclosed self-dealing might better
be located outside the mail fraud statute. 27
The other witnesses were less hesitant. University of Florida Law
Professor Michael L. Seigel complained, for example, that Skilling had left
the federal government unable to convict of mail fraud (1) a state prosecutor
who prosecuted an alleged murderer without disclosing the prosecutor’s
friendship with the murder victim, (2) a state legislator who sponsored
legislation aiding his alma mater in language that did not make the identity
of the benefitted university clear, and (3) “a disturbed employee of the
Department of Homeland Security who exaggerates a threat for the sheer
evil pleasure of causing a public panic.” 28
According to a member of Senator Leahy’s staff, the senator’s proposal
languished for a time because Republicans were concerned about
prosecutorial misconduct that had occurred in the case of their late
colleague, Senator Ted Stevens 29—misconduct that led the Justice
Department to dismiss the prosecution after Stevens had been convicted and
lost his seat. 30
By 2012, however, Leahy’s proposal had substantial bipartisan support.
Its sponsors in the House were James Sensenbrenner, the conservative
Republican Chairman of the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee, and Mike Quigley, a liberal Democrat. The House Judiciary
Committee approved it by a vote of 30 to 0. 31
The Senate Judiciary Committee also approved the measure. Senator
Leahy, a liberal democrat, and Senator John Cornyn, a conservative
26

See RESTORING KEY TOOLS, supra note , at 48-61.
Id. at 18-27.
28
Id. at 17.
29
Conversation with Noah Bookbinder, Chief Counsel on Criminal Justice of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, N.Y. City, Mar. 25, 2011.
30
See Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilbur, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case Against
Ex-Senator: Justice Department Cites Prosecutors’ Behavior During Stevens Trial, WASH.
POST, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1; Del Quentin Wilbur, Judge in Stevens Dismissal Known for
Tenacity, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A3.
31
See Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status, 112th Cong., H.R. 2572,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2572 (last visited Feb. 20,
2012).
27
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Republican, then offered it as an amendment to the STOCK Act, a bill
whose main purpose was to prohibit insider trading by members of
Congress. The Senate adopted the Leahy-Cornyn amendment by voice vote
and then approved the bill 96 to 3. 32
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post endorsed the LeahyCornyn amendment. Neither paper offered any argument or analysis beyond
the Times’ claim that the amendment was “badly needed . . . to better
prosecute corruption” 33 and the Post’s declaration that it “would restore
prosecutors’ ability to go after official corruption.” 34 All anyone needed to
know was that the amendment was an anti-corruption measure and that
corruption makes people very angry.
Bucking a strong political tide, the majority leader of the House,
Republican Eric Cantor, did not include the Leahy-Cornyn proposal in the
version of the STOCK Act he brought to a vote. 35 After the House approved
this version, the majority leader of the Senate, Democrat Harry Reid,
blamed Republicans for blocking a conference committee to resolve
differences between the two chambers’ bills. Following a vote for closure,
the Senate approved the House-approved measure by unanimous consent. 36
The STOCK Act signed by the President did not include the Leahy
proposal. 37
III. CRIMINALIZING UNDISCLOSED SELF-DEALING
As approved by the Senate, the Leahy proposal would create a new form
of mail fraud—“undisclosed self-dealing.” 38 At the core of the proposed
statute is a definition of this term. Unsurprisingly, the conduct proscribed by
the statute would have two elements—self-dealing and non-disclosure.
First, an official must “act for the purpose, in whole or in material part,”
of furthering his own financial interest or that of any of a number of other
people or organizations. They include his spouse, his minor child, his
32

Congress Moves on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20.
Id.
34
The Senate Bids to Tighten Up on Insider Trading, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2012, at
A14. Both papers rejected an op-ed opposing the measure by former attorney general
Edwin C. Meese III and me.
35
See Sung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Under Fire for STOCK Act Tweaks, POLITICO, Feb.
8, 20120, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72624.html.
36
See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2012, at A13.
37
See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
38
The bill declares that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ . . . includes a scheme
or artifice by a public official to engage undisclosed self-dealing.” See Congressional
Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?r112:1:./temp/~r112h08WqO:e25901:. [improve this cite]
33
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business partner, and any person or organization from whom or which he
“has received anything of value.” 39 Although the proposal borrows the term
self-dealing from the law of fiduciary obligation, it reaches conduct the law
has not regarded as self-dealing before. Every agent must act in the interest
of people he serves and not in his own self-interest, 40 but self-dealing
means self-dealing. Fiduciaries are not barred from contracting with people
from whom they have received things of value, need not recuse themselves
from decisions affecting the interests of these people, and need not disclose
everything of value they have received.
Second, the official must knowingly falsify, conceal, cover-up, or fail to
disclose “material information that is required to be disclosed by any
Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation or charter applicable to the
39

The list also includes any business or organization of which the official is an
employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner; any individual, business or
organization with whom or which he has any arrangement for employment or financial
compensation; and any individual, business or organization with whom or which he is
currently negotiating for employment or financial compensation.
The most sweeping item on the statutory list—anyone from whom the official “has
received anything of value”—has an exception, and the exception has confused some
readers. The proposed statute refers to receiving “anything of value, otherwise than as
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, or by rule or regulation.”
The first part of this language—“otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
discharge of official duty”—was apparently drawn from the federal gratuity statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201(c). The phrase refers to the payment of an official’s salary or other authorized
compensation for his official work. The added words “or by rule or regulation” probably
refer to payment of the official’s salary or other authorized compensation as well. The
draftsman might have added these words to make clear that “provided by law” does not
refer to statutory law alone; rules and regulations count too.
The placement of the additional words, however, is odd. The bill does not say
“otherwise than as provided by statute, rule or regulation for the proper discharge of
official duty”; it says “otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty, or by rule or regulation.” This placement has led some readers to conclude
that the bill does not reach payments authorized by any rule or regulation even when the
payments are not compensation for the performance of an official duty.
For example, a regulation prohibiting lobbyists from buying legislators’ meals might
allow lobbyists to host social events at which appetizers are served. See 5 CFR §
2635.203(b)(1). Some readers have thought that the bill would then exempt the receipt of
appetizers because their receipt is “authorized by rule or regulation.”
This reading seems improbable. Exempting conduct from a prohibition does not
“authorize” it for all purposes or exempt it from other prohibitions. Under the bill, a
legislator’s knowing violation of a law requiring the disclosure of a lobbyist’s appetizers
could be the predicate of a federal mail fraud prosecution if the legislator later acted to
favor the appetizer provider’s financial interests.
40
See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or
Best Interest, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 958-63 (2005). Moreover, under the law of trusts,
“transactions involving trust property entered into by a trustee for the trustee’s own
personal account [are] voidable without further proof.” Unif. Trust Code § 802 comment.
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public official.”
The word material in the phrase material information that is required to
be disclosed does not mean what the word usually means in mail fraud
prosecutions—having “a natural tendency to influence or [being] capable of
influencing [a] decision.” 41 Instead, the bill defines “material information”
as any information concerning the official’s own financial interest (when he
is alleged to have furthered his interest) or any information regarding his
“association, connection, or dealings with” anyone from whom he has
received something of value (when he is alleged to have furthered a
benefactor’s interest). 42
IV. THE FIRST ELEMENT: SELF-DEALING
A. The Ubiquity of Self-Dealing
Self-dealing sounds sneaky, but public officials cannot avoid it. Every
legislator engages in what the Leahy proposal calls self-dealing many times
each year. A legislator who votes to reduce taxes, for example, “performs
an official act for the purpose, in whole or material part, of furthering or
benefitting a financial interest” of everyone on the statutory list—himself,
his spouse, his employer, his business partner, and every person from whom
he ever has accepted a beer, a fruitcake, an honorarium, or a fee for
professional services.
Legislators commonly take official action to advance the financial
interests of large groups of people. They approve bank bailouts, farm
subsidies, tax breaks, rate increases, Medicare benefits, limits on credit card
fees, and more. The benefitted groups are very likely to include people who
have given things of value to the legislators. In addition, they are likely to
include spouses, children, employers, business partners, and the legislators
themselves. Under the Leahy proposal, any action taken to benefit a group
that includes any of these people is self-dealing (although the self-dealing
may be lawful either because the official has disclosed it or because no law
requires its disclosure). 43
41

See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999).
See Congressional Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at
[Improve
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r112:3:./temp/~r1129FkULN:e256323:.
this cite.]
Although Senator Leahy’s proposal would criminalize only conduct by public
officials, donors and others could be prosecuted for conspiring with the officials and for
complicity in their crimes.
43
State regulations sometimes prohibit action to benefit an official’s financial interest
when “the effect on that interest . . . is greater than the effect on a substantial class of
persons to which the [official] belongs as a member of a profession, occupation, industry or
42
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B. The Uncertain Status of Campaign Contributions
Skilling warned, “If Congress were to take up the enterprise of
criminalizing ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official . . . ,’ it would
have to employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to
overcome due process concerns.” 44 Senator Leahy therefore claimed on
various occasions that his bill was “precise, careful legislation,” 45 that it
was “carefully drafted to avoid ambiguity and lend certainty to the anticorruption law,” 46 and that it had “unusual depth and precision in its
definitions.” 47 Leahy made this claim even of the version of the bill he
initially introduced—one so ineptly drafted that it would not have
accomplished its purpose 48—and of the patched but ungrammatical version
approved by the Senate. 49
region.” See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 24.60.030(g) (2012); R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-7(b) (2012).
The Leahy proposal, however, has no comparable language. Benefitting a benefactor even
as a member of a profession or other large group appears to be self-dealing.
44
130 S. Ct. at 2933 n.44.
45
Press Release, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Looks at Scope of Skilling
Decision,
Sept.
28,
2010,
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=d8b2c597-548f-49cc-aaa99a888 jjj88333dfdtgyyb bnbgy7cb8792a8.
46
Press Release, Leahy, Casey Urge Senate Leaders to Push for Conference
Committee
on
STOCK
Act,
Feb.
12,
2012,
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/?id=31e50b7f-Idab-4f1a-9419dbbe35094439.
47
Press Release, Comments of Senator Patrick Leahy on Public Corruption
Amendment
and
the
STOCK
Act,
Feb.
9,
2012,
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=FA2892E5-FA31-42A0A2DC-50BAD999942D.
48
See S.3854, 111th Cong. (2010). This bill declared that a public official engages in
undisclosed self-dealing when he performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of furthering a financial interest of a person from whom he has received a thing of
value and knowingly fails to disclose “material information regarding that financial interest
in a manner that is required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation or
charter applicable to the public official.” What statutes, rules, and regulations may require
officials to disclose, however, are, not the “financial interests” of their benefactors, but the
“things of value” the officials have received from them. Apparently no member of
Congress or Congressional staffer noticed this glitch until I mentioned it at a conference
attended by the Chief Counsel on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
March 25, 2011. I should learn to keep my mouth shut.
49
Note the shift from verb to noun in this version’s description of the second element
of undisclosed-self dealing: “and (B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or
covers up material information that is required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or
local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public official, or the knowing
failure of the public official to disclose material information in a manner that is required by
any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public
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Although the Leahy proposal seems sufficiently precise to satisfy due
process requirements, 50 the senator’s claim of “unusual depth and precision
in its definitions” is open to doubt. One question the proposal leaves
unanswered is whether an official performs an act partly to further his own
financial interest when he performs this act partly to encourage
contributions to his re-election campaign. Another is whether he performs
an act partly to further the financial interest of someone from whom he has
received a thing of value when he performs an act partly to benefit a
campaign contributor.
The straightforward answer to these questions seems to be yes.
Campaign contributions are cash, which, as Yogi Berra has observed, is just
as good as money. 51 In addition, spending campaign cash can enable a
candidate to obtain a salaried position, something that unmistakably furthers
his financial interest. And office holders may use campaign funds for
purposes other than campaigning.
State law on the use of campaign funds often tracks federal law, and
since 1989, federal law has prohibited federal office holders, former office
holders, and current candidates from using campaign funds to pay personal
expenses. 52 Candidates and former candidates may, however, donate these
funds to charities without limit, to political parties without limit, and to
political campaigns other than their own within limits. They also may use
campaign funds to pay legal expenses if charged with official misconduct,
to buy furniture and art for their offices, and to pay other expenses of

official.” See Congressional Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at
(emphasis
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r112:3:./temp/~r1129FkULN:e256323:
added).
50
Under the Leahy proposal, an official cannot engage in undisclosed self-dealing
without knowingly violating a federal, state, or local law or regulation requiring the
disclosure of a conflicting interest. When the predicate disclosure laws are sufficiently
precise, officials can play it safe by complying with them. In Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46, 58 (1989), the Supreme Court indicated that the due process clause requires
no more. It held that, because a person could not violate Indiana’s RICO statute without
also committing some predicate offense defined by another statute, the vagueness of the
RICO statute itself did not matter. See id. at 58 (“Given that the RICO statute totally
encompasses the obscenity law, if the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former
cannot be vague either.”).
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fort Wayne Books may not be entirely persuasive.
Imagine a federal statute that forbids affecting interstate commerce by annoying others
while violating any valid state law.
51
See Yogi Berra, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra (last visited
Sept. 25, 2012) (noting Yogi Berra’s statement in an AFLAC commercial, “And they give
you cash which is just as good as money”).
52
See U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 154
n.428 (2003).
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campaigning and office holding. 53 Officials have used these funds to enable
their spouses to accompany them on work-related travel and to host
extended gatherings at five-star resorts in Vail, Park City, Puerto Rico, Las
Vegas, South Florida, and Bermuda. One member of Congress even has
used campaign funds to pay herself 18% interest on loans from herself to
her campaign. 54 If people were asked outside the context of interpreting
particular statutes whether officials further their financial interests and
receive things of value when they obtain campaign contributions, most
would find the question easy.
Nevertheless, taking official action to encourage campaign contributions
and to benefit the interests of contributors is, one suspects, extremely
common. Straining to save members of Congress from their folly, to save
other elected officials too, and to prevent every knowing failure to report a
campaign contribution from becoming a felony more serious than
manslaughter, 55 courts might hold that the Leahy proposal does not make
taking official action to encourage campaign contributions “self-dealing.”
C. Benefits Given to Friends and Relatives
Taking benefits in the form of campaign contributions might or might
not shield an official from prosecution for undisclosed self-dealing.
Channeling benefits to the official’s spouse and others close to him,
however, would preclude prosecution. Although taking official action to
further the future financial interests of a spouse, minor child, or anyone else
on the statutory list qualifies as self-dealing, acting to reward someone who
previously has given something of value to a spouse does not. Unless the
53

See id. at 154-55.
See 60 Minutes: Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable PACs (C.B.S. Television,
Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57608255/washingtons-opensecret-profitable-pacs/; Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and
Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A1; Ken Silverstein, Beltway Bacchanal:
Congress Lives High on the Contributor’s Dime, Harper’s Magazine, Mar. 2008, at 47;
Dave Mann & Abby Rapoport, Lifestyles of the Corrupt and Elected: How Do Texas
Legislators Live Large on their $7200 Salaries? Campaign Funds Pay for Lavish Perks
and Personal Expenses, Courtesy of Special Interests, THE TEXAS OBSERVER, Jan. 16,
2011, available at http://www.texasobserver.ord/cover-story/lifestyles-of-the-corrupt-andelected; Thomas J. Cole, Lawmakers Use Campaign Funds for Expenses, ALBUQUERQUE
JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 2012, at A1; Adam Schwartzman, Joe Bruno, Other Pols Use
Campaign Funds to Pay Legal Expenses, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS, Sep. 3, 2010, available at
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/09/joe_bruno_other.php.
55
The maximum penalty for voluntary manslaughter under federal law is 15 years. See
18 U.S.C. § 1112. The maximum penalty for mail fraud is ordinarily 20 years, but it
becomes 30 years when the fraud affects either “a financial institution” or disaster-relief
funds. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
54
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official himself has received a thing of value from a benefactor, taking
official action to advance the benefactor’s interests is permissible.
Similarly, an official engages in self-dealing when he benefits anyone
who has ever employed him or patronized his private business. He does not
engage in self-dealing when he benefits someone who has employed his
spouse or patronized the spouse’s business.
D. Benefits Given by Lobbyists and Other Friends
A banker might host a legislator’s trip to an old golf course in Scotland,
and the legislator then might vote in favor of bailing out the banking
industry. Under the Leahy proposal, the legislator would have engaged in
self-dealing.
The situation would change, however, if the banker paid large sums to a
lobbyist to urge subsidies for the banking industry and if the lobbyist then
hosted the trip to Scotland without any prompting from his client. 56 In this
situation, the legislator could defend against a charge of self-dealing by
showing that he did not act for the purpose in whole or material part of
favoring the lobbyist’s financial interests; rather, he acted to benefit
interests of the lobbyist’s client. And although the client paid the lobbyist’s
fees, he did not provide the golf outing; he was in fact unaware of it. 57
Gimmicky offenses invite gimmicky defenses. Permitting a lobbyist or
other “bagman” to provide benefits could defeat a charge of undisclosed
self-dealing.
Although legislators and other officials cannot avoid what the Leahy
proposal calls self-dealing, a benefactor intent on corrupting an official
probably could find ways around the proposal. Casting benefits in the form
of campaign contributions might be enough, and if it were not, he could
channel benefits to the legislator’s spouse or could hire a lavish lobbyist.
E. Advancing Financial Interests
The Leahy proposal requires courts to distinguish between actions
intended to advance benefactors’ financial interests and actions intended to
advance their other interests. Awarding a job, a scholarship, a grant, a lease,
a contract, a rate increase, or a commercial license usually makes a
benefactor richer, and approving a zoning change usually does too.
56

Cf.
Wikipedia,
List
of
Trips
Funded
by
Jack
Abramoff,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_trips_funded_by_Jack_Abramoff (last visited Nov. 13,
2013).
57
The client should avoid any conduct that might make him appear to be the source of
the benefit provided—for example, reimbursing the lobbyist for the cost of the trip.
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Approving a pardon for a benefactor, however, probably does not
further the benefactor’s financial interest (although the benefactor’s release
from prison might enable him to take a job and although the pardon might
make him eligible for an occupational license). Approving a low-digit
license plate, making an honorific award, or inviting a benefactor to stay
overnight in the Lincoln bedroom probably does not advance his financial
interest either (although status symbols and obvious friendship with
important officials could contribute to a benefactor’s financial success).
Approving a bridge sought by a benefactor probably would better his
finances if the bridge improved access to his business, but it might not
confer a financial benefit if the bridge merely made it easier for him to get
home. The issue might be whether the bridge would reduce the benefactor’s
expenditures on gas.
F. Proving Purpose
The Leahy proposal makes an official’s purpose crucial. He must
“perform an official act for the purpose, in whole or material part, of
furthering or benefitting a financial interest” of a person or group on the
statutory list.
“Purpose” is more than knowledge; the word refers to an actor’s goal,
desire, or conscious object. 58 If a legislator were to support a bank bailout
after accepting a trip to Scotland from a banker, the legislator might testify
that furthering his benefactor’s financial interest was no part of his
objective. Of course he understood that the bailout would advance the
interest of his host, but the legislator’s only purpose was to prevent a
collapse of the economy and thereby serve the public.
Offering a defense like this one would make the merits and demerits of
a challenged official action relevant. Did a lease, contract, grant, rate
increase, or zoning change further the public interest, or was its purpose
partly to feather a benefactor’s private nest? Members of Congress who
bemoan the federal deficit and maintain that the federal justice system is too
poor to afford trials to more than a small minority of defendants apparently
have no qualms about requiring courts to rehash at length the pros and cons
of official actions and the purposes that lie behind them.
V. THE SECOND ELEMENT: NON-DISCLOSURE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL,
STATE, OR LOCAL LAW

58

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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A. Standing Federalism on Its Head
The Leahy proposal incorporates the disclosure requirements of state
and local law, perhaps because Congress was unwilling to do the hard work
of devising uniform national standards, perhaps because it doubted that such
standards would be constitutional, 59 or perhaps because it simply had no
idea what disclosure requirements to impose.
Looking to state law, however, effectively moves trials for state
regulatory violations into the federal courts and causes federal law to vary
from state to state. In one state, the violation of a reporting requirement
punishable only by private reprimand or public censure is transformed into
a twenty-year federal felony. In a neighboring state, a failure to report the
same information is no crime.
Three states—Idaho, Michigan, and Vermont—require neither
legislators nor executive branch officials to disclose any gifts or honoraria
they receive. 60 Officials in these states (including the state Senator Leahy
represents, Vermont) might have little fear of prosecution for undisclosed
self-dealing. Twelve additional states—Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming—do not require legislators to disclose
any gifts or honoraria they receive. 61
Courts and commentators have argued that interpreting the term “honest
services” to incorporate state standards promotes federalism. 62 In fact, it
turns federalism upside down. Every state’s regulatory policy is a blend of
prohibition, punishment, and forbearance. Federalizing a state’s substantive
regulations without its accompanying penalty structure and enforcement
mechanisms diminishes state power. When a federal court assumes the role
of a state agency and punishes state violations much more severely than the
state legislature and state administrative authorities consider appropriate, it
deprives the state of the ability to govern itself.
Just as Senator Leahy’s proposal makes violations of noncriminal
59

See text at note infra.
Caitlin Ginley, 50 States and No Winners, State Integrity Investigation (a project of
the Center for Public Integrity, Global Integrity, and Public Radio International), available
at http://www.stateintegrity.org/state_integrity_investigation_overview_story.
61
National Conference of State Legislatures, Personal Financial Disclosure: Gift and
Honorarium
Requirements
(updated
Dec.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/personal-financial-disclosure-giftand-honoraria.aspx. Many of these states do forbid the receipt of specified gifts and
honoraria.
62
See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc);
George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail Fraud, State Law and PostLopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 282-86 (1997).
60
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regulations and fineable misdemeanors predicates for federal mail fraud
charges, the mail fraud charges become predicates for RICO and moneylaundering charges. 63 Predicates piled on predicates are wondrous tools. 64
B. Leahy’s Paradox
Casting aside state enforcement mechanisms and penalty provisions
offends basic principles of federalism, and incorporating some parts of a
state regulatory scheme but not others does too.
States respond to what the Leahy proposal calls self-dealing in several
ways. Sometimes they ignore it; sometimes they require its disclosure; and
sometimes they prohibit it either by forbidding the creation of a conflicting
interest (no official may accept a gift worth more than $50 from a
lobbyist) 65 or by requiring recusal when a conflict of interest arises (a
legislator may not vote on a bill if the legislator owns or has any financial
interest in a business likely to be substantially affected by the bill). The
Leahy proposal makes self-dealing a federal crime only when a state has
taken the middle path, regulating self-dealing by requiring disclosure. The
proposal does not reach either the kind of self-dealing a state ignores or the
kind it forbids—presumably the least troublesome and the most
troublesome kinds. 66
Consider, for example, a state legislator who has not disclosed that his
spouse owns a few shares of stock in an oil company and who votes to
make a block of state land available for oil development. Under the Leahy
proposal, this legislator’s fate would turn on his state’s laws.
In State A, no law or regulation might require disclosure of a spouse’s
stock holdings, and no law might require the legislator’s recusal. In State A,
the legislator would be guilty of no crime, state or federal.
In State B, a legislative rule might require a legislator to list in an annual
report filed with his chamber’s committee on ethics all stocks that he and
his spouse own. Violation of this rule could lead to public or private
reprimand or censure. In State B, the legislator would have committed a
major federal felony.
In State C, a statute might declare that legislators may not vote on
63

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(a) (money laundering).
Senator Leahy’s next book might be titled, Predicates Squared and Predicates
Cubed: Turning Minor Misdemeanors into Fantastic Felonies in in Three Easy Steps.
65
As noted above, several states do not require legislators to disclose the gifts and
honoraria they receive but do forbid the receipt of some gifts and honoraria. See note
supra.
66
To be sure, a state may employ two or more regulatory strategies simultaneously.
The fact that a campaign contribution is illegal, for example, does not excuse an official
from reporting it.
64
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matters substantially affecting enterprises that they or their spouses own in
whole or in part. Violating this statute might be a criminal misdemeanor,
but in State C as in State A, the legislator would be guilty of no federal
crime. Respect for federalism could not explain this result, for State C
would punish the legislator’s undisclosed self-dealing more severely than
State B would. Under the Leahy proposal, engaging in self-dealing that a
state prohibits is not a federal crime, but failing to report self-dealing that
the state requires reported is a major felony.
It would be fairer and more effective for Congress to draft a national
code of conduct for state officials, telling them what gifts and campaign
contributions they may accept, what gifts and campaign contributions they
must disclose, and what conflicts of interest require them to disqualify
themselves from acting. Such a code almost certainly would be
unconstitutional, however, 67 and even if it were not, it would depart from
almost everyone’s sense of the appropriate division of state and federal
authority. Although the fairer and more effective solution is unthinkable,
incorporating some state laws but not others for no coherent reason and
punishing violations of the incorporated laws much more severely than the
states consider appropriate seems to command broad bipartisan support.
67

See National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that
Congress may not force states to approve substantial expansions of their Medicaid
programs by threatening to withdraw federal funding from existing programs); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not force state law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of handgun purchasers); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not force states either to
accept ownership of radioactive waste or else to regulate it in accordance with federal
instructions). In Garcia v. San Antonio Motor Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the
Supreme Court overruled a prior decision and held, five-to-four, that Congress could enact
a minimum wage law applicable to the employees of state and local governments. The
federal government’s authority to assure minimum-wage parity among public and private
workers, see id. at 554, does not suggest that it may direct the performance of state
governments acting simply as state governments.
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute pursuant to the postal power rather than any of
the powers at issue in Sebelius, Printz, New York v. United States, and Garcia. But the
authority “to establish post offices,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, surely does not include the
power to promulgate a general code of conduct for state officials. Indeed, the thought that
this power authorizes the federal prosecution of a state official for undisclosed self-dealing
whenever any mailing by anyone is “incident to an essential part of the scheme,” see
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712 (1989), takes one aback. If any of the
Framers imagined that the postal power would enable Congress to police the ethics of state
officials, he had more sense than to say so out loud.
Some scholars have argued that Congress’s power and duty to guarantee each state a
republican form of government, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, authorizes it to apply anticorruption legislation to state officials. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a
Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 367
(1989).
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C. Federal, State, and Local Disclosure Rules: A Tangle
Although public officials cannot avoid conduct that the Leahy proposal
denominates self-dealing, the proposal punishes this conduct only when an
official has knowingly failed to disclose “material information that is
required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule,
regulation or charter.” A critical issue is the appropriateness of treating
violations of federal, state, or local disclosure requirements as federal mail
fraud. These requirements are often vague, prolix, hyper-technical, and
under-enforced. 68
A New York commission concluded that the state’s Ethics in
Government Act “mandates absurdly excessive financial disclosure
requirements” for more than 70,000 employees. 69 An ABA Committee on
Government Standards spoke of “a complex and formidable rule structure,
whose rationale is increasingly obscure and whose operation is increasingly
arcane.” 70 A director of the federal Office of Government Ethics
complained, “[E]ven an employee who sincerely wants to follow the rules
doesn’t have the remotest chance of understanding them.” 71
Abner Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the
D.C. Circuit, and former White House counsel, declared, “[W]e already
require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior officials
spend countless hours filling out countless disclosure forms. . . . The reports
are so complicated that most reviewers can’t understand what they are
reviewing, but they do serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary

68

The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, for example, requires officials to disclose the
economic interests of their spouses only when these interests are “constructively
controlled” by the officials themselves. 5 ILCS 420/4A-102 (2012). In Stein v. Howlett,
289 N.E.2d 409, 579-80 (Ill. 1972), the Illinois Supreme Court held that this language was
not unconstitutionally vague but offered no hint of what it meant.
Kathleen Clark has noted that “the Code of Federal Regulations contains over 130
pages of regulations governing required financial disclosure, conflicting financial interests,
receipt of gifts, honoraria and payment for teaching, limitations on outside earned income,
restrictions on employees’ affiliation with law firms, rules governing current employees’
ability to negotiate for future employment, and restricting former employees’ employment
options.” Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer
from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 61 n.13 (1996).
69
New York State Comm’n on Govt. Integrity, Restoring the Public Trust: A Blueprint
for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 173, 191 (1990-91).
70
ABA Comm. on Gov’t Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics &
Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADM. L. REV. 287, 290 (1993).
71
Jacob Weisberg, Springtime for Lobbyists, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 1993, at 33, 38
(quoting Stephen J. Potts).
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official.” 72
Funding for the enforcement of disclosure requirements is sometimes
close to nonexistent. In Delaware, a two-person Public Integrity
Commission is responsible for enforcing the ethical rules applicable to
48,000 public employees. 73
Even better funded agencies are likely to investigate only when they
receive complaints, which they almost never do. In its sixth year, the
Tennessee Ethics Commission had yet to penalize anyone. 74
The absence of effective enforcement can lead to frequent violation. The
South Florida SunSentinel reported that, although Florida law required
34,959 state employees to report the receipt of every gift worth more than
$100, the number who reported any gift in 2008 was 385. 75
Perhaps Senator Leahy’s proposed federalization of state reporting
requirements would prompt greater compliance with these requirements by
state officials. More probably, however, federal prosecutors would charge
failing to report self-dealing so rarely that compliance rates would not be
greatly affected. Prosecuting violations of state reporting requirements
would be simply a way to bring down officials believed on other grounds to
be malefactors. Congress would have added another handy tool to the
prosecutors’ overflowing kit. Sending prosecutor-picked malefactors to
prison could become even easier (and perhaps more fun) than shooting
gophers.
VI. THE PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF CREATING ANOTHER FORM OF
MAIL FRAUD
The Leahy proposal makes undisclosed self-dealing a form of mail
fraud rather than a separate crime. Because some courts had treated
undisclosed self-dealing as mail fraud prior to Skilling, the mail fraud
statute seemed to be where a prohibition of self-dealing belonged.
Prosecuting this conduct as a separate crime, however, would be far less
objectionable. 76
The kindest assumption is that the senator and his staff had no idea how
72

Abner J. Mikva, From Politics to Paranoia: Misguided Ethics Laws Have Given Us
More Mistrust, Not Less, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C2.
73
See Ginley, supra note .
74
See id.
75
See Brian Haas, Hidden Influence: Gifts to Politicians and Officials Go Unreported,
and Few Are Punished for it, Disclosure Records Suggest, S. FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Nov.
29, 2009, at 1A.
76
The suggestion is that Congress should make whatever it wants to punish a crime
rather than one form of another crime. If Congress wished, the jurisdictional “hook” could
remain placing something in the mail.

[February 14, 2014]

TERRIBLE TOOLS

19

mail fraud prosecutions work. The following description draws heavily on
the case of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, whom I represented
in unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings, but many other cases resemble
Ryan’s. 77 By throwing a mass of undifferentiated charges of unattractive
conduct into a churning cauldron, prosecutors undermine core procedural
protections and invite jurors to judge the defendant’s character rather than
his guilt or innocence of particular charges.
Were the Leahy proposal to become law, prosecutors would charge
corruption cases as they do today by alleging a single fraudulent scheme.
The indictment would declare that the scheme began at or before the
moment the defendant took office and ended when he left office or was
arrested. It would allege that the objects of this scheme were to defraud the
public of money and property, to deprive the public of the intangible right
of honest services, and to engage in undisclosed self-dealing. The alleged
scheme would have lasted for years. In the case of Governor Ryan, the
scheme allegedly began when he was elected as Illinois Secretary of State
and ended when he left the governor’s office twelve years later. 78
The bulk of the indictment would consist of paragraphs beginning with
the words “it was a part of the scheme” or “it was a further part of the
scheme.” Each of these paragraphs would recite unattractive conduct. The
defendant might be said to have used state property for political purposes, to
have awarded low-digit license plates to campaign contributors, to have
favored friends and benefactors in the award of government contracts, to
have accepted a secret political consulting fee, to have violated a campaign
77

Before I was associated with the Ryan case, I published a short commentary on the
unfairness of this prosecution. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & Rico Racket:
Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 113 (2006).
78
The defendant might protest that the indictment was “duplicitous”—in other words,
that it alleged many schemes, not just one—but he would probably lose. See, e.g., United
States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d
771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Warner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15727 at *67
(N.D. Ill.) (the case of Governor Ryan and his co-defendant Lawrence Warner). Courts
embrace the fiction that everything done during the defendant’s time in office was part of
one grand plot. They treat a “scheme” as though it were a one-person conspiracy,
borrowing precedents concerning the scope and duration of conspiracies without reflection.
Ninety years ago, however, the courts took a more sensible view. See McClendon v. United
States, 2 F.2d 660, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1924) (“[I]t has never yet been thought that the
‘scheme to defraud’ . . . could be found in the mere succession of diverse swindles,
unrelated save as they had a common stage.”).
The pretense that all of the defendant’s conduct was part of a single scheme would
guide the trial judge in ruling on pretrial motions and conducting the trial. At the end of the
trial, however, the judge would perform a breathtaking feat of prestidigitation and shrink
the scheme to almost nothing. He would solemnly instruct the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen,
you need not find the scheme charged in the indictment. Discovering any tiny scheme
anywhere along the way will be enough.” See text at notes infra.
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pledge not to accept gifts worth more than $50, to have instructed a
subordinate to be more pleasant to a campaign contributor, to have shared
confidential government information with private advisors, and more. All of
the rotten things people said about him when threatened with prosecution
themselves would appear in numbered paragraphs. Some of the alleged
misconduct would have violated criminal or civil regulations, and some
would not. The indictment of Governor Ryan included all of the allegations
listed in this paragraph.
The allegations would not be listed under the headings “money-property
fraud,” “honest services fraud,” and “undisclosed self-dealing.” The
indictment would simply declare that they were all “parts of the scheme”
and that the scheme included the three unlawful objects.
After setting forth the alleged scheme for many pages, the indictment
would charge several counts of mail fraud—each of them a mailing in
furtherance of the unitary scheme. The mailings might be innocuous—for
example, an election board’s mailing of a certificate of the defendant’s
election to office. 79
The trial would continue for weeks or months as jurors heard
descriptions of the defendant’s allegedly improper behavior. The jurors
would react initially to the drip, drip, drip of evidence without having been
instructed on the law. 80 The trial of Governor Ryan lasted nearly six
months.
At the end of the trial, the judge would instruct the jury that the
government need not prove all of the acts alleged to constitute the
fraudulent scheme. Proving any act that established the elements of mail
fraud would be enough. The issue presented to the jury would be whether
any of the dirt thrown at the wall had stuck. 81
The defendant might or might not be entitled to an instruction that all of
the jurors must agree on which act or acts the government had shown. He
might or might not be entitled to an instruction that the jurors must agree on

79

In the case of Governor Ryan, the alleged mailings did relate to particular aspects of
the alleged scheme and did permit the jury to separate some aspects of the scheme from
others. My guess, however, is that the prosecutors would not have written the indictment
that way if they had considered the issue more carefully. They rarely took less advantage
than the law allowed.
80
Judge William Schwarzer compares the jurors’ experience to watching a baseball
game without being told the rules of baseball until the game ends. William W Schwarzer,
Reforming Jury Trials: The Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 129-30.
81
See, e.g., United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v.
Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (5th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11,
15 (8th Cir. 1966).
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which of the three kinds of mail fraud had been proven. 82 Even if the trial
judge were to give one or both of these unanimity instructions, no one
would know whether the jurors followed them, which act or acts they
considered proven, which act or acts they considered legally sufficient, and
which theory or theories of mail fraud they employed. The defendant would
not be entitled to special verdicts on any of these issues. 83
The jury would be unlikely to untangle the mass of evidence it had
heard. Following the conviction of Governor Ryan, a newspaper reporter
asked jurors which allegations had been most influential. Juror James
Cwick replied, “There was a whole lot of stuff out there. You could pretty
much take your pick.” 84 He added, “Each box, each piece of evidence was a
brick, and if you put all the evidence together, it was a house.” 85 Juror
Kevin Rein explained, “It wasn’t a smoking gun. I went into deliberations
with a feeling something was probably not on the up-and-up—and after 5½
months [of trial] you have an idea.” 86
Patrick Collins, the chief prosecuting attorney, commented, “This case
82

On the same day the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Skilling, it reversed
another conviction for mail fraud in Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010). In
Skilling, the trial court instructed the jurors that they must agree on which form of mail
fraud the government established. In Black, no such instruction was given. See Jessica A.
Roth, Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 170, 214 n.161 (2011).
Many court of appeals decisions touch on whether jurors must agree about which
alleged acts in furtherance of the supposed scheme the defendant performed or schemed to
perform and which form of mail fraud the government established. None of the decisions,
however, appear actually to resolve either of these issues. See, e.g., United States v. Joshua,
648 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055, 1068-69 (9th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 888-89 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Walker, 97 F.3d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court has supplied a hornbook rule that leaves the critical questions
unanswered. “A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it finds that the
government has proved each element” of an offense, but “a federal jury need not always
decide unanimously . . . which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an
element of a crime.” Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999).
83
Whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury is left to the trial judge’s
discretion, and judges have submitted them in some mail fraud cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Joshua, 548 F.3d 547, 553-54 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, “[s]pecial verdicts in
the criminal law are disfavored.” See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385,
1413 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989).
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was tried witness by witness, piece of evidence by piece of evidence, and it
was only by looking at the totality of the case that the true picture could be
shown to this jury.” 87 It is no surprise that prosecutors describe the mail
fraud statute as “our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our
Cuisinart.” 88
American courts ordinarily exclude “other acts” evidence. Although a
defendant accused of purse snatching may have been convicted a dozen
times of purse snatching, the jury will not learn of his prior convictions.89
This evidence will be excluded because jurors should not be tempted to
convict the defendant simply for being a bad person; they should judge the
accusation of a particular wrongful act at a particular time.
Mail fraud trials, however, are extended smear campaigns. They have
something in common the “hooliganism” trials of the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China. 90 These trials disgrace American justice, and
Senator Leahy has found a way to make them worse.
CONCLUSION: WHAT’S WRONG WITH CONGRESS?
When a lawyer reviews a proposed will, trust, lease, statute, or other
document, he typically asks whether the language of this document will do
what it was intended to do, whether it will do things it was not intended to
do, and whether it will be fairly and effectively implemented. No member
of Congress and no staff member, however, seems to have adverted to the
defects of the Leahy proposal described in this article. Although many
people on Capitol Hill are law school graduates and members of the bar,
there appear to be no lawyers there.
The story this article has told about Senator Leahy’s proposal echoes
87

Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Guilty: A Juror’s View, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Apr. 18, 2006, at C1.
88
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771
(1980).
89
See Fed. R. Ev. 404(b).
90
China abolished the crime of hooliganism in 1997, but one defendant convicted of
this crime remained in prison in 2011. See Quan Li, Lawyer Seeks Pardon for China’s Last
Hooligan, ChinaDaily.com, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201101/07/content_11811269.htm. Russia still punishes hooliganism, see David M.
Herszenhorn, Anti-Putin Stunt Earns Punk Band Two Years in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2012, at A1, but the Russian statute proscribing hooliganism is more precise than the
statute proscribing honest-services fraud in the United States. See Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation, Art. 213 (defining hooliganism as “a gross violation of public order
which expresses patent contempt for society, attended by violence against private persons
or by the threat of its use, and likewise by the destruction or damage of other people’s
http://www.russian-criminalproperty”),
available
at
code.com/PartII/SectionIX/Chapter24.html.

[February 14, 2014]

TERRIBLE TOOLS

23

the story of federal criminal law generally. It is a story of statutory sprawl—
of criminal statutes that reach well beyond the situations their authors
apparently meant to address. Much, though not all, 91 of this sprawl is
attributable to Congress’s use of vague, overbroad, and difficult-to-limit
language. The tale could be told not only of the Leahy proposal but also of
the mail fraud statute, the honest services statute, the Mann Act, the Hobbs
Act, the false statements statute, the Money Laundering Control Act, the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, RICO, and many sentencing and
forfeiture provisions.
When federal criminal statutes sprawl out of control, Congress almost
never reins them back. Cutting back would invite charges of depriving
prosecutors of important tools and of not caring about particular forms of
criminal conduct. Members of Congress understand how easy it is for
opponents to make these charges and how difficult it is to respond.
Moreover, members have little incentive to engage in good legislative
housekeeping when they can score points by voting to add another flashy
tool to the prosecutor’s kit. In the area of criminal justice, the only press
good housekeeping is likely to get is bad press.
Nearly 50 years ago, Congress approved and President Johnson
appointed a bipartisan commission to draft a new federal criminal code. At
the time, roughly two-thirds of the states recently had revised or were in the
process of revising or their own codes to incorporate proposals offered by
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code. 92 The federal criminal
code was less chaotic then than it is now, but then as now, it consisted of
myriad ad hoc accretions to an archaic nineteenth-century core. After
laboring for several years, the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Law, headed by former Governor Edmund G. Brown of California,
presented its draft in 1971. 93
Nearly everyone praised this draft. Then partisans on both sides of the
aisle sought to improve it. Despite the draft’s uncontroversial core, it sank
amidst disputes about the death penalty, the insanity defense, the protection
of official secrets, and a few other issues. 94
The wrangling and posturing that torpedoed revision of the federal
criminal code in the early 1970s occurred in a less partisan era than ours. 95 A
91
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comparable effort would be hopeless today. 96 In 2011, even Senator Webb’s
proposal to establish a bipartisan commission to study the criminal justice
system—a proposal supported by groups as diverse as the National Sheriffs’
Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, the ACLU, and the NAACP—
failed to attract enough votes to overcome a Senate filibuster. 97
Congress’s hyper-partisanship may be the primary reason for its low
approval ratings, 98 and its undemocratic procedures may contribute to public
disapproval as well. Republicans and Democrats were united in supporting
the Leahy proposal, however, and no member of Congress opposed this
measure publically. In the last Congress, only woefully undemocratic
procedure kept this measure from becoming law. The majority leader of the
House thwarted the will of an overwhelming majority of both houses and did
so without explanation.
Although a fiscal crisis may be bringing the era of mandatory minimum
sentences and ever increasing prison populations to an end, 99 the Leahy
REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS INTO AMERICANS (2012); Lee Hamilton, Why is Congress
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Center
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proposal and its reception indicate that posturing on criminal justice issues
is not over. 100 A flaw as serious as political partisanship may be members’
lack of motivation to do quiet work that promises little or no political payoff
(or to ensure that staff members do this work or to find academic and other
lawyers willing to do it for free).
I have been tempted on occasion to cast aside my accustomed role as a
lawyer and to write a work of political theory with the title “Democracy
Sucks.” Every mention of my thesis, however, prompts some sage to recite
Winston Churchill’s line, “[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government
except all others . . . .”101 Critics of my thesis apparently think only of
monarchy, dictatorship, and hereditary aristocracy when they consider
alternatives to democracy, and these alternatives are indeed worse.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, however, fully embraced my
thesis and pointed to a better alternative. On the first full day of the
Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph declared, “None of the
[state] constitutions have provided sufficient checks against democracy.”102
Elbridge Gerry later told the convention, “The evils we experience flow
from the excess of democracy.” 103 James Madison wrote in Federalist 10
that pure democracies were “spectacles of turbulence and confusion.”104
Alexander Hamilton proclaimed that the ancient democracies “never
possessed one feature of good government.” 105
The Framers never spoke of democracy without disparaging it, and the
Constitution they drafted did not speak of it at all. Although this document
provided for the direct election of members of the House of
Representatives, it provided other means of selecting all other federal
officials, including the President, members of the Senate, and justices of the
Supreme Court. The Framers would have disapproved of a government like
ours in which legislators “are essentially campaigning and raising money all
the time.” 106 They hoped to create a “mixed” system in which officials
Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2013, at A11.
100
Moreover, government corruption is a well chosen crime du jour. It stirs the
resentful sentiments of almost everyone, including members of both the Occupy Wall
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would have enough distance from politics to consider the public good.
When asked at the end of the Constitutional Convention what form of
government the convention had approved, Benjamin Franklin is supposed to
have said, “A republic if you can keep it.” 107 Americans have not kept it. 108
Politicians hire expert consultants to determine how to push our hot buttons.
They then push these buttons without much regard for how their proposals
are likely to work in practice.

eds., 2000).
107
Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Constitution of 1787, 11 AM. HIST.
REV. 595, 618 (1906).
108
In the 1980s, a brief republican revival among legal scholars seemed to evaporate
when critics noted that earlier republicans owned slaves, limited the franchise to male
property owners, and were disagreeably elitist in a number of other ways. See, e.g., Linda
K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668-89 (1988). My
contemplated work of political theory would not embrace all of the Framers’ positions.
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